



Guidelines for Position Paper Writing¹

A **Position Paper** is a brief summary of a country's policy and interests concerning the topics on the Agenda. It should contain a clear statement of the country's position on the topic and clear reasoning, also suggesting a plan of action concerning the issues under consideration.

The Position Paper should be a product of the delegate's own research and should be concise and substantial.

In the **first part** of your Position Paper you should briefly address the issues on the Agenda, the relevancy and the scope of the problem. You should mention the major entities involved (states, IGOs, NGOs etc), the current developments concerning the issues under discussion, the actions which have been taken in this respect, whether by specialized agencies, international and regional governmental organizations or non-governmental organizations, the most significant resolutions that have been passed, international treaties and provisions for future action.

In the **second part** you should specify the official position of the country you represent in respect to the issues under consideration. It should include brief statements about where your country stands on the issue in question, past statements on the topic by representatives of your government, especially if these mention the significance of the issues on the Agenda to your country, specific suggestions that your country will support in providing a solution for the issues in question. You should also make reference to the role the Union for the Mediterranean has assumed to confront this issue. You do not need to go into detail about your negotiating positions.

Remember that you have to represent the position of your assigned country. Therefore you should not speak in the first person ("I"), but with the voice of the country you represent. You may offer your own ideas on the solution of the problem, but bear in mind that the ideas that you present the committee with, should not contradict with the policies of the country you represent.

RhodesMRC requests that each delegate submits a position paper, covering each

¹ This document was inspired by and based on the "Guidelines for Position Paper Writing" of ThessISMUN (www.thessismun.org).

committee and council which is simulated, no later than mid-September. These papers should not exceed in length **one and a half page on each topic on the Agenda** of the committee or the council.

Position Paper Format

Committee:

Country:

Topic Area A:

Topic Area B:

Sample Position Paper

Committee: Security Council

Country: Bahrain

Topic Area A: Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

(Represented by the Academy for the Advancement of Science and Technology in Academy Model United Nations 2010. www.academymodelun.org)

I. India and Pakistan have a history of conflict. Ever since the two states were partitioned and granted independence in 1947, there has been start-and-stop fighting, mostly of a religious nature. Pakistan is mostly Muslim and India is mostly Hindu, though each has a minority of the other religion. Shortly after independence, there were riots and fighting as millions of people who were now part of minority religious group in the wrong country fled across the border. Since then, there have been many other wars, especially over the province of Kashmir. Conflict between India and Pakistan would not, however, be any more important than any other border fighting between countries except for their development of nuclear weapons. In 1974, India tested a small nuclear device of 15 kilotons (KT). Pakistan, lagging behind, announced in 1987 that it had acquired a nuclear bomb. In 1990, USA President George Bush imposed unilateral military sanctions on Pakistan for pursuing a nuclear program. Nevertheless, development continued in both countries, and on May 11,

1998 India tested large-scale nuclear devices. Two weeks later, Pakistan followed suit. Although the two countries have since then met to discuss, among other things, their nuclear situation, and both countries signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), they have refused to sign the NPT. Furthermore, both have worked on developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering their weapons to greater distances. Security Council resolution 1172--passed on June 6, 1998--condemned the two states for their tests, pointed out that under the NPT they could not legally become nuclear states, and urged them to disarm; no action has since been taken.

II. Bahrain is extremely concerned about the proliferation of nuclear arms in India and Pakistan. Its proximity to the region makes it a surety that if any nuclear exchange were to take place, Bahrain would be caught in the fallout. Bahrain is also concerned about the effect on the other nuclear powers--particularly China, which borders on India. This development could destabilize the world nuclear status, and that would be a disaster. Bahrain is, however, equally concerned about the mistreatment of its Muslim neighbor Pakistan. It is clear that in this situation India is the aggressor and Pakistan has trodden this fateful path only to maintain its national security through parity with its belligerent neighbor. As one traces the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia, one cant help but notice that at each landmark, India took the next step before Pakistan did. Furthermore, the imposition of sanctions by President Bush--and especially only on Pakistan--is quite uncalled for. Nevertheless, Bahrain believes that this situation can be defused--particularly since the Security Council (SC) has only issued one resolution dealing with this issue since the weapons tests, compared to many resolutions on such equally pressing issues as Kosovo or Iraq.

Bahrain recognizes the impossibility of adding India and Pakistan to the list of approved nuclear states. This would set the terrible precedent that the NPT is worthless, that any state which develops nuclear weapons can demand to legally keep them simply because they exist. Though this policy may be less than fair, it is the best way to maintain international peace and security--and that, after all, is the role of the SC.

Bahrain believes that negotiation is the first and best road to disarmament. Perhaps a coalition of nuclear states can by treaty formally declare that they will protect one of the two nations--preferably Pakistan, since it is the victim and will presumably disarm more willingly--in the case of nuclear attack. This would allow that state to disarm its weapons without fear of weakness. The opposing state would then be encouraged to disarm, as there is no longer any question of parity. Perhaps UNMOGIP--the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan--can be utilized to insure security and make the transition a smooth one. UNMOGIP currently has a force of only 45 observers; an enlarged UNMOGIP could be used to safeguard nuclear weapons as they are transported to neutral disposal sites. If this plan proves unworkable, perhaps stronger measures can be taken, although Bahrain is leery of imposing full economic sanctions due to the poverty of both nations.

Bahrain believes that this issue is one in which the normal conflicts among permanent

members of the SC (P5) will not hamper effective action, as no P5 country is allied with India or Pakistan or has its interests directly entangled with theirs--in fact, it is in the interest of the P5 and all other countries to defuse this situation now. Although it has temporarily stabilized, nobody wants a South Asian Cold War--and the possibility that relations between India and Pakistan could destabilize is frightening. Bahrain believes that at this meeting the SC can really accomplish something significant by dealing with this problem. We must only be careful to understand India and Pakistans motivation in developing nuclear weapons and seek to work with them, rather than against them.