Union for the Mediterranean

Topic A: Making cultural diversity visible in the urban space: empowering individuals with migrant background as agents for intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Med societies

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„Can this Sea be seen as a set without considering fractures dividing it and conflicts tearing it apart: Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus, the Maghreb, the Balkans, former Yugoslavia, and so on? 'Does the Mediterranean exist elsewhere than in our imaginary world?' A question as often asked in the South as in the North, in the Ponant as in the Levant. Yet, there are common or close ways to live, despite the numerous scissions and conflicts.

Today, several definitions that are part of our heritage are still dubious and questionable. In fact, there is nothing called a single Mediterranean culture: there are rather several cultures within a unique Mediterranean. Such cultures are characterized by traits that are a mixture of similarities and dissimilarities at the same time, rarely united and practically never identical. Their similarities are due to the proximity of a common sea and the meeting of nations and neighboring expression forms along its shores. Their differences are marked by facts of origin and history, beliefs and customs that are sometimes irreconcilable. Neither similarities nor differences are absolute or constant and, more often than not, the former win over the latter."

Predrag Matvejević

1) Introduction

a) Urban Space

In developed or developing countries, urban regions lie at the heart of the economic, social, political, and cultural transformations of contemporary societies. Today's metropolitan spaces are subjected to economic, political and social processes of a structural nature, which disrupt their functioning and transform their organization. Globalization of the economy, political decentralization, regional integration processes (e.g. the European Union, ALENA, MERCOSUR, etc.), the deregulation and privatization of public services, old and new forms of socio-spatial segregation, territorial dynamics, and socio-cultural, ethnic and religious diversification: all these processes bring about profound change in the equilibria that have shaped and governed modern societies. The issues at stake in urban regions affect the social, political and economic organisation of our societies, thus influencing the relationship between nature and citizenship. To take an interest in urban regions is to question and analyze the marked trends that cause doubt to be cast on the validity of the social, economic and political mechanisms enabling the constitution of political communities.

In this sense urban regions are the starting points for the transformation of modernity, and for the criticism of institutions, of collective identities, of the prevailing representations of the roles, positions and functions of the actors and agents at work there. Concurrently, this deconstruction process leads to innovation, to imagining new social links, new forms of solidarity, new relationships between the spaces composing the urban region, and new mechanisms for the coordination of public policies. More especially, these dynamics change the relationships between local civil societies and the political realm, relationships that challenge the traditional mode of aggregating citizen preferences, which is based on the primacy of elections and representative democracy.

Urbanity is par excellence a space of interaction among groups of people. These groups tend to form communities which are often defined by affinities in the cultural background of its members. Far from being fixed, these communities evolve according to the movement of human being across borders, both in the short and the long term.

b) Migration and security

International migration is one of the main issues of the twenty-first century affecting the lives of more people as well as the policies of more states. It is estimated that little more than 2 percent of world's population were living outside their countries of origin by the late 1990s. In line with the general tendency in the world, the concerns regarding the migratory flows from third countries have moved to an upper place in the European Union (EU) agenda after the 1990s. In this new era, discourses have started increasingly to concentrate on the destabilizing effects of migration on public order, cultural identity, and domestic and

labour market stability in the European countries. Therefore, the issue of migration has been subject to a process of securitisation.

Along with this securitisation process, the issue has also gained political sensitivity in the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1990s. Due to the mounting magnitude of the migration in the Mediterranean, the EU and the member countries have begun to perceive the migratory flows from the third Mediterranean countries as a threat to the stability and welfare of European states and societies especially after the 9/11 bombings. Hence, migration-security nexus has strengthened in the Euro-Mediterranean relations frequently hindering a balanced and comprehensive assessment and leading to the neglect of the humanitarian aspect of the issue. Furthermore, the restrictive policies of the EU have proved to be rather ineffective in reducing the migratory pressure, in particular the pressure of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean.

The phenomenon of international migration is on the increase, involving some 214 million people or over 3% of the world's population. In addition, there are some 740 million internal migrants worldwide. These movements tend to correlate with development in the countries concerned, and increasingly concern skilled workers and higher proportions of women. Migrations may also be enforced, whether dictated by demographic, climate or political factors. The phenomenon is also becoming more complex, with most of the world's regions now directly concerned by either the departure, arrival or transit of migrants, and some countries actually affected by two or even three of these trends.

In the light of these recent changes, the phenomenon of migration now constitutes a major international issue subject to complex international and local governance.

2) Historical Background: an Overview on the Contemporary Migration Trends

a) 1945 – 2000

The Mediterranean region takes its place as a "rapidly-evolving, semi-peripheral region" in the world arena which has a "traditional surplus of labour" creating under-employment in the agricultural sector and other labour-intensive sectors of the economy. Therefore, migration has always played a significant role in the relations between the European Community (EC) and the non-member Mediterranean Countries. Indeed, the history of migration flows from the southern Mediterranean to Europe goes as back as to the 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s Western Germany, France and Belgium, which faced labour shortages, were actively recruiting temporary migrant workers or "guest workers". In the beginning, these workers were mostly from southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Greece. But in the 1960s as the migration flows from southern Europe declined, the northern countries started to accept immigrants also from eastern and southern Mediterranean.

Thus, "extra-European" migration flows to Europe were added to the "intra-European"

migration. Previous colonial ties had a relevant impact on the structuring of these flows. As expected, France received most of its immigrants from Maghreb countries whereas the UK recruited workers mostly from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other former British colonies in the Caribbean. Additionally, countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden widely resorted to guest-worker policies in the post-Second World War era. The conclusion of bilateral recruitment agreements between the EC members and Mediterranean countries provided an additional momentum to the migration across the Mediterranean. For instance, Germany concluded recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961, 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). As a result, the number of immigrants rose drastically during the 1960s and 1970s.

Both the sending and receiving countries were satisfied with the increasing immigration trend to Europe in those years. Emigration was assessed by the sending countries as a way of keeping unemployment under control and a source of income due to worker remittances. On the other hand, immigration meant cheap labour and a way of supporting European post-war economic development for the receiving countries. But the enthusiasm of the receiving countries for immigration started to decline after the 1973 oil crisis and the following economic recession which was accompanied by increasing unemployment.

The worsening socio-economic situation resulted in “a shift from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive policy” in Europe. However, despite the policies aiming to limit immigration, the immigrant population continued to increase because of family reunifications in the late 1970s and 1980s. Hence, family reunification took its place on the agenda of European countries and the temporary guest workers increasingly turned into “permanent settlers”.

The 1980s also witnessed an important change in the nature of the migration issue in the southern European countries as the “globalisation of migration” was increasing the number of countries influenced by immigration. The economic development of southern Europe and accession of these countries to the EU turned these countries into emerging destinations for emigration from the southern Mediterranean. The immigration trend into southern Europe gained impetus particularly in the late 1980s and during the 1990s. Southern European countries witnessed an increasing amount of immigration primarily from the southern Mediterranean for the first time in their history. Despite the uncertainty in the numbers, the number of legal migrants in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece tripled between 1981 and 1991. Thus, the “traditional role of southern Europe as a labour reserve” had reversed. Historical emigration countries have become immigrant countries receiving immigrants especially from North Africa. This was in a way a “revolution in the traditional pattern of population flows from Mediterranean to Europe”. This new development played a role in the perception of the immigration issue as a common problem in Europe in the following decade.

By the early 1990s, the concerns in Europe grew further. Numbers of asylum seekers

were increasing, whereas tight European immigration laws led to climbs in the amount of irregular migration flows from non-EU Mediterranean countries. Consequently, the rising visibility of immigrants combined with social problems of the "new settlers" resulted in intensifying pressure on the receiving countries. Moreover, the member states, who were taking steps for the development of free movement within the EU and for a degree of harmonization in their immigration and asylum policies, were facing additional difficulties due to the complexity of this process. As a result, these factors altogether started to draw more attention to the issue especially in the media.11 In this era, political discourses have started increasingly to concentrate on the destabilizing effects of migration on public order and domestic stability in the European countries.12 Thus, migration has become a highly sensitive political issue in the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

b) 2000 – to date

The Mediterranean is now one of the major regions of emigration in the world. Ten Mediterranean Partner Countries involved in Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) have 10 to 15 million first-generation emigrants in different countries. First-generation emigrants from these countries represented around 4.8% of their total population which reached to 260 million in 2005.

The destination of migrants from third Mediterranean countries varies according to their origin. Migrants from the Maghreb countries and Turkey mainly tend to go to Europe, whereas the ones from Eastern Arab Mediterranean countries tend to prefer the Arab oil-exporting countries and other parts of the world. Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are the countries which have the highest amounts of migrants in the EU among the non-member Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, migrants from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and to a certain extent Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority flow mainly to the Gulf States.

Statistical data indicate the presence of approximately 5.8 million immigrants in the EU from third Mediterranean countries, excluding "unrecorded" migrants. Germany and France, two traditional destination countries, jointly have nearly three-quarters of this number, and the other quarter is shared among the other twenty-three EU countries. The Netherlands, Spain and Italy rank as the next three countries after Germany and France. The three largest national origin groups are Turkish (1.9 million), Moroccan (80.000) and Lebanese (48.000) in Germany; Moroccan (726.000), Algerian (686.000) and Tunisian (261.000) in France; and Turkish (196.000), Moroccan (168.000) and Egyptian (11.000) in the Netherlands.

In fact, Spain and Italy recently acted as new magnets for migrant workers from the southern Mediterranean. Since 2003, Spain has received the largest amount of immigrants flowing to the EU. Of the 1.6 million people migrating into the EU in that year, 594.300 flew to Spain. This was more than twice the migration Germany (144.900) and France (55.000)

together received. On the other hand, Italy attracted 511.200 migrants in 2003.

On the other hand, irregular migration is also an important reality in the Mediterranean as the sea serves as one of the key gateways for the "unrecorded" immigrants seeking to flow into the EU. The issue has started to be addressed with increasing urgency, especially by the EU states bordering the Mediterranean after the 1990s. Indeed, as irregular migration is a clandestine movement in nature, it is hard to quantify the scale of it. The only available data regarding the issue are the border apprehensions of the would- be immigrants. According to the estimations of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 100.000 to 120.000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year, with approximately 35.000 flowing from Sub- Saharan Africa, 55.000 from the south and east Mediterranean and 30.000 from

other (mainly Asian and Middle Eastern) countries. The number of irregular migrants in the EU was estimated to be around 2.6 million by the 2000s. The main sea routes for irregular immigrants who generally travel under unsafe conditions in overloaded boats and who are thus named as "Mediterranean boat people" have been:

- from the Maghreb direct to the southern coast of Spain, or via Melilla and Ceuta;
- from Turkey to Greece or Sicily;
- from the south-eastern Adriatic coast to Italy, and especially Puglia;
- from Egypt (or the Maghreb via Tunisia) to Sicily or mainland Italy, sometimes via Malta.

Throughout the 1990s the Straits of Otranto (between Italy's Adriatic coast and Albania) and the Straits of Gibraltar (between Spain and Morocco) have been the two important entry gates along the EU's southern maritime border. Although being over the most popular routes Greece, Spain and Italy are not always the final destinations as many immigrants subsequently move to Austria, Germany, France, Benelux and other EU countries. But as it is mentioned earlier, southern Europe has become one of the favourite places of residence in the late 1990s. The majority of immigrants are Moroccan in Italy and Spain, and Albanian in Greece and Italy.

3) Impact of Immigration on our societies

a) Heterogeneous *civitas*

One main difficulty in researching the influence of immigration on the *civitas* relates to the question of how to measure and assess the impact of immigrants on the dynamic phenomena of culture in general. Culture develops in complex ways, and the impact of immigrants on the culture of European societies cannot be simply measured according to the number of immigrants settling in the various countries over time. Migrants are a heterogeneous group in that they come from different cultural backgrounds. Nor can the autochthonous population be considered to be a homogeneous group. Another general

analytical problem in assessing migration and culture concerns how the impact of immigrants on the *civitas* should be distinguished from the impact of the general trends of globalisation. While it is clear that, for instance, the consumption of new cuisine and diets have changed the eating patterns in European societies, it is not clear whether this is primarily based on the impact of immigration or whether this is due to globalisation. Nevertheless, a general transformation of the *civitas* in the cultural context in Europe seems to have taken place on account of immigration.

The impact of immigration on the area of cuisine and food consumption is obvious when one looks at the wide range of 'foreign' foods, the increase in number of 'ethnic' restaurants and the changing eating habits of the autochthonous populations in Europe. This trend is not only significant for the further development of cultural life in European countries. It has also far-reaching economic implications. It is therefore surprising to note the lack of literature and data on this issue.

Immigration has had an impact on sport as well. This is well documented in some country studies at hand. Immigrants participate in various sport activities, for instance, in youth clubs at the grass-roots level. Often, a majority of the youth involved have migratory backgrounds, especially in large urban areas. Amateur sport clubs play a central role in community life throughout Europe. Migrants often play a central role in professional sports as well. They often become even the 'heroes' of many European sport clubs. Many stars in professional sports have become naturalised citizens of their countries of settlement. From an economic viewpoint, allochthonous fans and customers also contribute to the business side of professional sports. Furthermore, immigrants have brought with them new sport traditions from their countries of origin as part of their social capital. These traditions have been partially integrated into the formerly autochthonous sport activities. Even though sport in general is seen as significant to the integration of immigrants, the allochthonous populations have found themselves in nationalistic conflicts with autochthonous fan groups. Conflicts between allochthonous and autochthonous groups triggered by sporting events, for example, football matches, have been reported in the mass media. This has resulted in political and academic debates on whether sport should be considered to be one of the central means of cultural integration at all. New anti-racist and pro-tolerance campaigns, however, have been launched with the goal of settling such conflicts. In addition, immigrants have been at the centre of controversies regarding some regional or religious traditions which exclude certain immigrant groups from participation in sports instruction in school.

The influence of immigration on the world of fashion is perhaps one of the most evident manifestations of the adoption of allochthonous cultural expressions in European societies. The country studies in the framework of the EMN give insight into the reasons for this. There seems to be a trend towards 'exoticism' in styles created by the fashion industry. A general trend towards 'ethnic fashion' is recognisable as a segment in the textile market. As some of the studies highlight, elements of the autochthonous population, mainly in urban

settings, seem to be adapting their clothing towards the traditional clothing of the allochthonous populations.

The impact of immigration on the arts in the European societies is as manifest as in other areas. In order to speak about immigration and art, one first should define which forms of art should be taken into account. For analytical purposes, a holistic approach seems appropriate here. In this sense, the term 'art' denotes a wide variety of artistic expressions, ranging from popular mass productions, to traditional artistic activities and folkloristic presentations as well as to the so-called 'elite arts'. Immigrants have clearly had an influence on all of these expressions and on the autochthonous artistic cultures in themselves. The work of some immigrant authors is rather popular. Immigration and integration experiences are issues that are often dealt with in film, theatre, poetry, prose and the like. As in the other areas, a differentiation between the impact of immigr-ation and that of globalisation is difficult to make. But, it is safe to argue that these phenomena have worked together to diversify the former as autochthonous conceived civitas in Europe.

In this sense, wide-ranging effects of immigration on media organisations and their products can be observed. Media outlets seem to be adapting to the allochthonous populations in the countries of settlement by developing a mix of specialised programmes for and from immigrants and cultural minorities. These adaptation tendencies not only include changes in content and thematic focus, they also include programming on new issues that are seemingly important to immigrants, or on immigration and integration topics geared towards the autochthonous populations. The country studies suggest that there is a growing tendency to diversify media products all over Europe, although globalisation may be a factor here. Media consumption patterns often differ among the various immigrant groups and the autochthonous populations. In addition, the internet is becoming more and more important. Internet sites are run by immigrant organisations, and projects aimed towards immigrants have their own internet sites. These often serve as discussion forums as well.

b) Immigration and Politics

Immigration clearly has an impact on the political discourse in European societies. As a prominent example, the political participation of immigrants has been debated in the context of awarding voting rights in most of the studied European countries. This includes creating institutions of participation, as well as parliamentary and advisory instruments for migrants. A wide variety of civil society institutions and migrant self-organisations have facilitated the political participation of immigrants as well. Systematic research is still lacking with regards to the political participation of immigrants in trade unions.

The development of civil society organisations, including political initiatives, religious groups and non-govern-mental organisations is a feature in modern Europe. Migrants have taken part in these developments in all European countries under review. They are active not only in migrant self-organisations, but also in predomin-antly autochthonous civil society

organisations. The activities of migrant self-organisations differ from country to country for a number of reasons, including the level of diversity in the political frameworks of each country and the diversity among immigrant groups and immigrants themselves. Also, the various traditions of organisational life in the countries at hand provide diverse frameworks in which allochthonous organisations find their bases. Despite the fact that early migrant associational life has been thoroughly researched in the past, recent trends have been left largely unstudied. Comparative research in this area would be an important contribution to understanding the impact of immigration on associational life and civil society formation in European societies.

All country studies address the participation of third country nationals in elections. Voting rights for immigrants on the national level are discussed in some studies, mainly in the context of naturalisation. In some reviewed countries, third country nationals are allowed to vote on the various governmental levels. Where the vote is granted, an impact of immigration on the politics of the locality or region is clear. In addition, various European countries have set up immigration or advisory boards that work towards representing allochthonous groups. These advisors are partly recruited from immigrant populations. According to research carried out in some of the studied countries, the power of such boards is limited because they primarily focus on the symbolic presentation of so-called 'immigrant voices'. It may be based on this lack of power that the involvement of allochthonous populations in specific advisory and consultative bodies has been rather unsuccessful. However, other findings suggest that these boards have affected communal migration policies and the social and cultural integration processes for new immigrants.

A rising number of immigrants have expressed interest in participating in the parliamentary systems of some of the countries at hand. The increase in the number of civil society organisations seems to confirm this growing interest. The participation rates of immigrants in trade unions seem to be slightly higher than in political parties. In some of the countries at hand, large numbers of immigrants are members of trade unions. Both the history and current situation of immigrant participation in trade unions is of interest due to both the changing role of trade unions in the European post-industrial polities and new employment patterns among immigrants.

The modern diaspora situation of immigrants and the transfer of political issues and means from the countries of origin to the countries of settlement are slowly becoming noticed in European polities. This transfer occurs on three levels: the 'importing' of organisational traditions and political worldviews from the country of origin to the country of settlement, a sustained political orientation towards the country of origin, and the development of new global formations in political communication.

c) Factors influencing the process

The *polities*, *civitates* and economies of Europe have been clearly transformed by immigration movements and the settlements of immigrant groups. The impact thereof is

observable in many areas, but the migration regimes vary greatly among the countries at hand. Moreover, these regimes determine the individual extent and nature of the impact of immigration to a great degree. In general, research shows that a number of factors influence the impact immigrants have on societies. Nine central factors will be discussed in order to better understand the phenomenon.

The first factor concerns the various laws and regulations that directly deal with immigration and integration. Laws and regulations – on the local, regional, national, European and international levels – determine the legal framework of the migration regimes at hand. Each country's legal framework is based on particular traditions and historical developments. The relationship between codified and precedence-based law is complicated as well. In international law, the roles of treaties, contracts, multilateral agreements and the like are rather difficult to understand with regard to political decision-making and the legal situation of certain immigrant groups.

The second factor that aids in determining the impact of immigrants on their countries of settlement, concerns the access of immigrants to the labour market. Here, the number of legal provisions geared towards improving the access of immigrants to specific national labour markets is on the rise, as noted in many country studies at hand. Recent immigration policies have determined the nature and the extent of access to the labour market for certain groups of immigrants. These include refugees, seasonal workers, contract workers and other migrant worker groups. The policies vary greatly from country to country.

The third factor concerns the welfare state in general. Here, differences in social benefits are important with regards to immigrant groups in the countries that were studied. For example, access to social benefits for labour migrants, foreign students, dependants, migrant children, etc. varies from country to country. Separate regimes have been developed in the countries under review for asylum applicants. In some countries they have a limited access to social benefits. There seems to be a trend towards restricting this access to an even greater degree, seemingly to 'discourage' asylum seekers.

The fourth factor involves housing. In general, the housing situation of immigrants is inferior to that of the autochthonous population. This may diminish the positive impact of immigrants on the societies at hand. A central problem concerns the provision of social housing to needy immigrants or the accommodation of special immigrant groups, such as refugees or asylum seekers. These policies differ from country to country, as does the housing situation for immigrants on the whole. Oftentimes, the outcome of past housing policies regarding immigrants has resulted either in the local concentration of immigrants and segregation between the allochthonous and autochthonous populations, or in the merging of lower income autochthonous populations with the lower income groups of immigrants in the same areas.

The fifth factor involves the health care system. It is important to look at the differences in access to the health care system from country to country, especially the differences of entitlement with regards to the varying residence status. Some countries grant equal access

to all residents, whereas in other countries the access to health care depends on preconditions, such as the payment of fees for certain health services. Separate health care provisions for asylum seekers exist in most European countries. On the other hand, special services have been established for the care of specific immigrant groups, such as trauma centres for war refugees and services for irregular immigrants.

The sixth factor that determines the impact of immigration on their countries of settlement concerns education and language proficiency. It is important for immigrants that they have access to the educational systems in their countries of settlement. In most European countries, all immigrants have the right to attend state schools. In some European countries, public provisions exist concerning the access of immigrants to private schools. Various educational opportunities and facilities exist for immigrants in the countries at hand. However, in some countries at hand the achievement level of immigrant children is considerably lower than the average level of autochthonous children. In this sense, difficulties in speaking the language of the country of settlement are important. Another issue concerns the entry of immigrants to higher education. In some countries, free access, special scholarship and fee systems are provided for them. In most countries, the residence status plays a role in determining the entry into higher education. Similarly, the provisions for vocational training and adult education differ from country to country. In most European countries, special regulations exist for the entry, settlement and education of certain groups of immigrants, such as au pairs, students, apprentices and interns. In addition, language training is a central problem for many immigrants. New policies geared towards practically forcing immigrants to learn and speak the national languages in their countries of settlement have been developed in most European countries.

The seventh factor concerns political rights. These include voting rights in local, regional, national and EU elections, as well as participation rights in other political bodies in which elections are required, such as some welfare state organisations. Furthermore, there is the right to citizenship through naturalisation. In some European countries studied, citizenship has still some national prerequisites, for example, the United Kingdom, where there are special citizenship rights for Commonwealth and Irish citizens. In some countries, dual citizenship is relatively common, whereas in others it is illegal. In the EU, most member states either have recently revised, or are planning to revise their naturalisation regulations.

The eighth factor concerns support for integration. In most of the studied European countries, benefits and institutions have been established to advise and help immigrants in their countries of settlement. The definition of integration varies from country to country, with a wide range of integration schemes. Some are geared towards strengthening the multicultural society, others towards assimilation. Some former guest worker countries and new immigration countries are only beginning to develop integration strategies. Currently, a policy geared towards establishing integration support is being implemented EU-wide. Nevertheless, wide differences exist among such efforts on the local, regional and national

levels in the countries under review, especially with regard to the institutions responsible for integration policies, the amount of funding available and the specific areas of integration.

The ninth factor concerns the exclusion and discrimination of immigrant groups in the European countries at hand. Social exclusion has a lot to do with other factors, such as housing, income levels and welfare benefits. It is also closely related to the historical cycles of immigration. The nature and effects of social exclusion differ from country to country. In all cases, the excluded populations have less impact on the development of the society at hand than other social groups which experience less exclusion. Discrimination also plays a role when determining the situation of allochthonous populations and their impact on European societies.

Other factors influence the impact of immigration on European societies. These nine define only the most important areas. It was not the central task of the country studies to research these nine factors, however, it appears that the situation concerning such factors does differ from country to country.

d) Classification of local policies towards urban interculturality (Europe)[1]

It is important to appreciate that cities operate within widely varying national and local jurisdictions and values systems and that this influences the way they may respond over time to demographic change and cultural diversity.

Despite these differences, what is striking in recent years is that most countries have felt the need to look afresh at the way they do things, whether in response to the demographic change we have reviewed, or in reaction to crisis events in the UK, the Netherlands, France or Spain. The Council of Europe and the European Commission welcome this process of review and the prospect that a new policy consensus may now begin to emerge based upon the principle of *interculturality*.

It is possible to take Europe over the last 30 years and identify several distinct approaches to minorities and diversity in different local and national contexts through time. These can be summarised as follows:

- Non-policy
  whereby migrants and/or minorities have been regarded by the city as an irrelevant or transient phenomenon with no lasting impact – or they are considered unwelcome – and therefore there is no perceived need for the city to formulate a policy response;
- Guestworker policy
  migrants are regarded as a temporary labour force which will eventually return to their countries of origin and so policy is seen as short term and designed to minimise the impact of migrants on 'indigenous' citizens;

[1] From: Phil Wood (ed.) *Intercultural Cities. Towards a model for intercultural integration.*

- Assimilationist policy
  migrants and/or minorities can be accepted as permanent but it is assumed that they will be absorbed as quickly as possible. Their differences from the cultural norms of the host community will not be encouraged and may even be discouraged or suppressed if they are considered a threat to the integrity of the state;
- Multicultural policy
  migrants and/or minorities can be accepted as permanent and their differences from the cultural norms of the host community are to be encouraged and protected in law and institutions backed by anti-racism activity, accepting of the risk that this may in some circumstances lead to separate or even segregated development;
- Intercultural policy
  migrants and/or minorities can be accepted as permanent and whilst their rights to have their differences from the cultural norm of the host community are recognised in law and institutions, there is a valorisation of policies, institutions and activities which create common ground, mutual understanding and empathy and shared aspirations.

4) The Challenge on International Level

a) Constructing a Mediterranean Region: A Cultural Approach

New theoretical perspectives on the role of culture, identity, social communication, and regionalism in international relations lead us to suggest that the process of migratory policies in the Euro-Med region may be an important case of international change. To a great extent these new theoretical perspectives are related to a recent "constructivist turn" in International Relations theory. Constructivism suggests that cultural and normative factors are critical to the development of international cooperation. Moreover, peaceful change may depend on the development of mutual trust and shared identities. Mutual trust and shared identities develop through transactions, socialization processes, and common institutional developments.

These ingredients of international change are central to new theoretical frameworks of regionalism in international relations. Theorists of regionalism point to regional integration in the post-cold war context as a key indicator of international change because regional integration changes the character of state sovereignty and national identity. Thus, the new literature on regionalism no longer conceptualizes regions in terms of geographical contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states which often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space. Theorists of the new regionalism hypothesize that the purposeful guidance of these interactions can lead to the creation of a regional political culture and a regional “identity” that will have important implications for peace and stability.

b) Identity, Security, and Peace

A central premise of the new regionalism theories is that states' interests and their sense of security are relative and dependent on their identities. The definition of an actor's identity ("we") is always in reference to another actor ("them"), and this need for an identity defined in opposition can lead to conflict. As new regions are created and existing regions are enlarged, a new "we" may be created. A common identity can ease negotiations and compromises among conflicting interests, provide a basis for shared interests, and thus create a more solid basis for political stability. New social identities are constructed around commonly agreed attributes, norms, and principles of legitimate behavior. The identification of shared identities and mutual interests can thus replace threat perceptions. "Talk-shops," "seminar diplomacy," and confidence-building measures, widely practiced by the OSCE, NATO's Partnership for Peace, and a variety of Asian institutions, are strategic interactions aimed at creating an environment that can lead to the creation of shared meanings, social reality, and mutual trust.

Identity, however, is neither a "cause" of security in any positivist sense, nor it is a necessary or a sufficient condition for its existence. Rather a shared identity is a collective meaning that becomes attached to material reality, thus helping to constitute practices, which make people feel more secure within their national or their transnational "borders." Shared social identities thus play a constitutive role in that they account " for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist.". In this sense shared identities can be learned by agents, whose intentions can then play a causal role in the construction and reconstruction of security practices. In addition, identity always works in relationship to and interacts with other social processes and variables, including material resources. This is why it is mistaken and futile to artificially separate between "ideas" and interests and to stick to a purely materialist understanding of power. Of course interests are usually articulated with the help of material resources, but identity enters the power equation in the way people set agendas and talk about the world. It also enters in the ability of people to make their identity-based understandings of reality "stick" as taken-for-granted collective reality.

This "identity" approach to security is consistent with a "social communication" theoretical understanding of regional integration. This theoretical understanding suggests that a regional political identity does not emerge from the convergence of pre-existing actors' interests, but through conceptual bargaining and argumentative consensus. Over time, as key concepts and norms are accepted as a part of collective identity, the spread of that identity arises from active persuasion and socialization rather than solely from instrumental bargaining and the exchange of fixed interests. Instrumental agreements are not unimportant, however, and political actors often use normative understandings in a rhetorical fashion for instrumental reasons. However, instrumental use of norms and instrumental agreements may in time become the structures within which deeper processes of social communication and the internalization of values and norms develop.

We are not naïve to think that, across cultural and civilizations and among states that have conflicting interests, processes of social communication free of power politics and instrumental considerations can easily develop. Nor do we believe that it is possible to think in the context of regional conflict resolution and conflict prevention about social communication processes that resemble Habermas's ideal type of dialogue aimed at shared understandings. The reason is that a necessary condition for such processes to occur is the previous existence of a "life-world" of shared understandings, meanings, and discourse. But these are precisely the missing elements in conflicts that pit states, not only with different interests and power capabilities, but also with different cultures and civilization backgrounds.

Where lies, then, the potential of social communication for constructing collective identities and thus helping to promote security and peace? Persuasion which appeals to the scientific truth of statements, as in epistemic communities, will not do. Moral persuasion also is very unlikely, not only because many of the most intractable conflicts are about the location of the just and moral point, but also, because people do not agree on the meaning of justice. Thus, the potential of social communication to change identities, promote trust, and help change interests in the direction of security and peace, relies on social communications' effect on people's practices. Said otherwise, social communication may motivate people to practice the same practices. And it is the practical or pragmatic agreement on practicing the same practices, for example, the rule of law, which, in time can lay the basis for conflicting actors to develop reciprocal peaceful dispositions.

The most obvious example of this process in which the purposeful shaping of a common identity is expected to lead to regional stability is the enlargement of the European Union. The Cold War had created a “we-versus-them” dynamic in Europe built on a perception of threat that raised the odds of violent conflict to levels deemed unacceptable. The integration process, however, rested on a common cultural basis and was driven by expectations of enhanced security and economic welfare. The accession of the Visegrad countries into the EU, for example, is a deliberate attempt to bring these countries into a shared identity called “Europe” that has already been constructed around a specific set of norms, principles, and behaviors spelled out in the Accession criteria. These criteria are intended to construct a new liberal, capitalist, democratic identity in former Communist countries through a set of specific practices. Those countries that desire to be part of the European “region” must demonstrate that they have built new institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. They must develop a functioning market economy and show that they have the ability to take on the obligations of community membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The architects of the criteria that leads to and enforces these practices believe that they create a common identity necessary for regional integration and thus, for regional security.

The belief that security is built on a common identity is nowhere more obvious than the

EU's unexpected decision to accept a second wave of applicants for EU entry. That decision was taken under the pressure of events surrounding the wars of Yugoslav succession and the Kosovo crisis. When war broke out in Croatia in 1991, policy-makers recognized it as the first war since 1945 on what they considered to be European soil. The failure of various European efforts to contain the crisis—from offering aid to a united Yugoslavia to the creation of a European Monitoring Mission to oversee various cease-fires led to important "learning" on the part of EU elites. EU intervention in conflicts on European soil would not be enough; a common European identity was the surest road to a stable peace on the continent. At the end of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, EU elites believed more than ever before that war in Europe could only be prevented through the creation of a common European identity deeply embedded in EU membership.

It must be noted, however, not to push the generalization potential of the European case too far. Conditions in Europe may not be replicable elsewhere, and it would be unwise to argue that what was good for fifteen European countries will necessarily be good for the West and Islam, or for Israel and Palestine. By this it this not meant that a social communication theory cannot be applicable to other regions, such as the Mediterranean. Rather, that we first need to understand better the conditions under which pluralistic integration may develop in the Mediterranean. And there must also be awareness of the huge obstacles that Mediterranean integration effort faces and will continue to face.

Pluralistic integration may be so difficult to achieve, not only because it takes time for people to change their identities. As shown by the examples of Europe, and, to a lesser extent, South East Asia, people may be able to develop new transnational identities, which overlap with, and stand on top of, deeper and older national and ethnic identities. The difficulty is rather one of agency, because, for pluralistic integration to succeed, agents must first seize material resources and constitutive norms, and develop reasons and the political will, which then makes possible the construction of collective identity transnational spaces. Once such cognitive regions are socially constructed, however, people can then imagine that they share their destiny with people of other nations, who happen to share their values and expectations of proper action in domestic and international affairs. This is why social communication and pluralistic integration may be conducive to peace. Karl Deutsch called these regions, security communities, in which integration leads to a "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way".

Culture and identity lie at the heart of the world's most intricate security problems. But to what extent are they components of a solution to those problems? How can culture and identity contribute to peace? Increasingly, both analysts and politicians associate regional security with regional integration that encompasses the development of regional identities and a common political culture. To explore the security-enhancing role of culture and identity as an integral part of regional integration, we develop here a framework for the analysis of the process of "region building" in the Mediterranean area. Post "September 11"

events, and the nefarious prospects of a "Clash of Civilizations" between the West and Islam, make the exploration of the relation between culture and security, and the fate of the Mediterranean integration, even a more urgent and necessary endeavor.

5) EURO-MED migration policies

a) Evaluation of EU's Migration Policies in the Mediterranean in a Future Perspective

Migration issues have been increasingly placed at the centre of various areas of cooperation between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries. This central role of the issue has emerged as a result of "communitarisation" of migration policies with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, as well as the externalisation of migration policies of the EU. This externalisation results from the efforts of the EU to adopt a "cross-pillar approach" to migration with an emphasis on financial aid for third countries with the aim of fostering development to reduce migration.

Given the general increase in the migration movements from southern Mediterranean to Europe in the recent decades, there has been a perception in the European countries that the reduction of the vast economic development gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean could lower migration pressure. Throughout the world, it is recognized, particularly in the destination countries, that there is a need to use some economic instruments such as trade liberalisation, direct investment and development aid in order to reduce emigration incentives in the sending countries. Among these instruments, trade liberalisation through regional economic integration has been considered to be the most promising instrument. This strategy includes four assumptions:

- Economic situations determine the tendency to move.
- Development decreases the motivation to migrate by stimulating employment and income.
- A free market economy provides the most efficient environment for development.
- An open economy decreases wage disparities through trade and capital flows.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated in November 1995 between the 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean countries can be assessed as the reflection of this understanding. Dr. Jean-Pierre Derisbourg, adviser to the European Commission Directorate General responsible for North-South Relations, indicated the "desire to put a brake on immigration to Europe" as one of the basic reasons for the establishment of the Partnership. The general goal of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is "turning the Mediterranean region into an area of dialogue, stability and prosperity" and as stated in the Barcelona Declaration, this requires sustainable and balanced economic and social development and measures to combat poverty. The migration issue is handled under the third chapter of the EMP on social, cultural and human affairs. It could be expected that the Barcelona Declaration and the Work Programme addressed the primarily the anxieties of

the EU which are the issues of “illegal immigration” and the readmission of “illegal immigrants” to the sending country.

Apart from the chapter on the social, cultural and human affairs, the economic and financial chapter of the Partnership is also related with the migration issue as it aims to target the root causes of immigration especially by means of establishing a free trade area between the partners by 2010. The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is to be achieved mainly through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. These agreements are presented as “catalysts” for accelerating slow growth rates, decreasing the development gap, unemployment and migration. In this regard, the Initiative reflects the “EU’s faith in the virtues of free trade” in tackling north-south disparities.

In the Euro-Mediterranean case, trade liberalisation has been perceived as the most appropriate way among these instruments to address the objective of reducing the development gap and therefore reducing the migration incentives. The liberalisation is intended to accelerate the integration of the Mediterranean countries with the neoliberal global system, as well as to control more easily the impact of soft security issues such as migration. Considering this strategy of the EU, whether trade liberalisation through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements constitutes a substitute or a complement for migration is one of the most questioned topics. In fact, trade liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Area seems to operate neither as a complement nor as a substitute because of the limited context of trade liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership just including the trade in industrial goods. However, in the long-run, provided that trade liberalisation is achieved, especially in agriculture which constitutes the comparative advantage of the southern Mediterranean countries, trade might have the effect of a decrease in migration.

Taking into account the strong root causes of migration in the Euro- Mediterranean area, it should be noted that the motto of “trade but not migration” as we see as the rationale in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership seems too “narrow” and does not fit with the reality since migration is, and will be continuing. It is obvious that stagnating economic development and high population increases continue to stimulate migration from southern Mediterranean to Europe. Hence, it can be said the initiatives in the Partnership to decrease migration could not be successful.

However, further trade liberalisation towards creating a Euro- Mediterranean Free Trade Area, including trade in agriculture in which the South has comparative advantage, might move the development frontier further to the south of the Mediterranean leading to a decrease in immigration from southern Mediterranean to the EU in the long-run. Although the migration frontier for Europe took its place in southern Europe twenty or more years ago, the development gap and “migration frontier” shifted to the Mediterranean Sea and this region emerged as “Europe’s Rio Grande”. In the future, it can be expected that the frontier might shift south the Mediterranean with the help of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade

project by 2010. This expectation is due to the theoretical consideration that, for the countries not included in the free trade area, the external tariff constitutes an inducement for the substitution of migration for products, and thus foster more immigration from these countries.

On the other hand, recently, another important instrument of the EU's migration policy in the Mediterranean has been the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was established with the policy documents in March 2003 (Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours) and in May 2004 (European Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper) aiming to promote "a ring of friends" throughout the EU's neighbourhood. As the neighbourhood policy has been at the centre of EU foreign and security policy, it could be stated that it is also at the centre of EU migration policies in this region. The significance of this initiative for EU's migration policy is that it gives the signals of countering the argument of "fortress Europe" creating new "dividing lines", and "inclusion/exclusion" debate with regard to enlargement. This can be inferred from the wording of "a stake in the internal market" and as Romano Prodi said "everything but institutions". Although these are criticized as blurred wordings, it seems to offer free movement and liberal migration policies through visa facilitation throughout the process.

However, the positive tone of the Commission Communication on Wider Europe in 2003 towards the inclusion of free movement of persons as part of the policy towards the neighbourhood becomes less warm when the details are regulated. Nevertheless, regarding some of the grave concerns in the social policy agenda of the EU, the ageing of the EU population and the need for high skills, the Commission states that "free movement of people and labour remains the long-term objective". The Communication does not seem to associate the exclusion of movement of persons with intensified securitisation but addresses the opposite of this process which is inclusion.

The European Neighbourhood Policy adds new objectives and defines new financial instruments for the relations with the Euro-Mediterranean countries intending to deepen cooperation on migration management and border controls, and suggest incentives such as preferential trade relations, improved technical assistance, and improved cooperation in a variety of fields. Besides, the ENP involves an "ad hoc approach" to cooperation on migration management. This "ad hoc approach" has created a "differentiation" principle among the countries. Furthermore, conditionality has a significant role in the ENP. Considering the political and economic situations and the institutional and legal framework in each third country, the EU differentiates its cooperation with these countries and rewards progress in this process.

However, along with the "differentiation" principle, it should not be ignored that each third country has to meet specified key priorities, otherwise, the EU's migration policies towards its neighbourhood might not be effective and lose its credibility. These priorities were defined at the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council as follows:

- participation in the international conventions and resolutions relevant to refugee

protection and the protection of human rights;

- cooperation on readmission and return of the country's nationals and of third-country nationals;
- efforts on border controls and prevention of "illegal immigrants";
- fight against human-trafficking and adoption of related legislative measures;
- cooperation on visa policy and adaptation of their visa systems;
- creation of asylum systems, with an emphasis on access to effective protection;
- efforts on redocumentation of the country's nationals.

The EU neighbourhood can be defined as a multi-coloured area. When the regulations on migration are examined, it is seen that the neighbouring countries are very different among each other although they have common borders. When the neighbourhood policy was established, it included a generous spirit of inclusion of the neighbours in internal market offering free movement of persons as well as the other freedoms. However, the offer with regard to the free movement of persons seems to have changed significantly. There is a modest offer related to short stay visa policy or legal migration. As regards short stay visa policy, only for some countries, visa facilitation is possible. Regarding legal migration, there are very modest offers to the neighbours by the EU. As stated by Guild, there exists an "impression that a bundle of rights and possibilities which have already been accorded in other venues and by other means are being repackaged in the ENP and presented as 'carrots' to encourage the neighbours to buy into the repressive measures".

With regard to irregular migration, EU policy in the neighbourhood might seem to create a buffer zone between the EU and other third countries. Exchanges of information, preventing irregular migration flows, readmission agreements are the main points of ENP Action Plans in this field. With the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, the Community became competent to conclude these visa facilitation agreements, but only a few neighbouring states have signed these agreements. This policy of the EU might harm the neighbours' relations with their neighbours since the neighbours will have to "take coercive action against the nationals of their neighbours". Instead of strengthening solidarity and create a "ring of friends" in the ENP area, this kind of an approach could be expected to cause tensions and instability. Moreover, as the European Commission declares, "from a human rights point of view, [the reinforced border control capabilities] ...could mean that more people would be intercepted, refused entry and/or removed to their countries of origin, where they probably face a situation of poverty and lack of freedoms." On the other hand, the efforts to create incentives and to identify shared commitments, especially in the framework of ENP Action Plans serve as a reflection of an understanding that the participation of neighbouring countries in the joint management of migration flows will be of key importance in the development of an EU migration policy.

In this respect, the future migration policy of the EU tends to be in "a model of concentric circles" rather than a fortress model. In the concentric circle model, as defined by Emerson, the centre tries to regulate the system with the neighbours classified according to

their geographic and political distance from the centre.

At this point, it is essential to mention the Strategy Paper prepared by the Austrian Presidency in July 1998, which offered a “model of concentric circles”. The Paper stated that the countries especially placed in the inner circles should progressively be included in the border controls of the EU, readmission policies and the fight against irregular migration. Since 1998, this model has been debated by many scholars such as Lavenex and Ucarer and Thouez. With the inspiration of the Strategy Paper and these two studies, figure 3 presents the model for the future of the migration policy of the EU which is renovated according to the recent developments in the EU. In this model, there are four circles where the EU constitutes the inner circle. Candidate countries to EU membership who are in the process of harmonizing their legislation with acquis communautaire particularly on visa issues, border controls and readmission policies are placed in the second circle which is a temporary place prior to accession.

The third circle will be consisted of Mediterranean partners and eastern neighbours who are in the context of Neighbourhood Policy of the EU, with whom the EU needs to cooperate intensively in order to manage migration and asylum movements. These countries are expected focus on “transit checks and combating facilitator networks”, thus having a role of “buffer zones” to reroute population movements before their arrival on EU territory. Hence, these countries will be in close cooperation with the EU on migration policies and enjoy some liberal migration incentives by the EU. The last circle of Middle East, China, Africa, USA and Latin America will be based on policies regarding “illegal” migration and asylum and decreasing push factors in these countries.

As declared in point 61 of the Strategy paper, a country meeting its obligations would be rewarded. For instance, the second circle must meet Schengen standards as a precondition for EU membership. For the third circle, “a stake in the internal market” might be offered and economic cooperation and development aid might be offered for the last circle. In the light of this model, in case of an attempt to construct a “fortress Europe” behind the new borders of the enlarged EU, the neighbours would not be kept totally outside the process.

Thus, cooperation with Mediterranean countries is very significant for the EU on migration issues. However, the tendency of the EU to securitise migration issues both in its internal and external affairs, seen as putting most emphasis on irregular migration and readmission agreements rather than the other aspects of visa facilitation and legal migration, might hinder the success of cooperation with Mediterranean countries.

While there is an awareness that the impact of “root causes policies” might be “visible” in the long-run, these causes should be addressed immediately, rather than trying to block immigration into the EU. Mainly focusing on readmission and repatriation in EU Action Plans on Migration does not seem as the most proper way to “build peace and prevent future conflicts” in the region.

b) The Euro-Mediterranean migratory policies

It is essential to promote cooperation on questions of migration with the countries neighbouring the EU. This cooperation should bear in mind the double role that these perform as countries of origin and of transit. For the countries that have already negotiated an action plan, the European neighbourhood policy offers to both parties a structured framework for dialogue. For the countries that have not yet negotiated an action plan, association agreements and cooperation offer an adequate legal basis for pursuing action and dialogue.

Geographical reasons, along with a whole range of push and pull factors, are behind the growing importance of African emigration to the European continent. However, and in addition, in the case of African immigration, the status of former colonies of some countries has given rise to an especially-close relationship.

Within the framework of the Barcelona Process a rapprochement between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean was initiated, including in immigration matters. Subsequently, immigration became one of the fundamental axes of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In matters of illegal immigration, the conclusions of the presidency of the European Council of Brussels of 15 and 16 December 2005 focussed the attention on Africa and the Mediterranean, in an attempt to intensify dialogue with the ACP countries and to firm up collaboration with our Mediterranean partners, seeking methods of increasing cooperation between member states in the control of external borders. In particular, it was concluded that there is a need to participate jointly in studying the viability of the Mediterranean network of coastal patrols and the Mediterranean system of control and to employ all the existing frameworks of cooperation in order to prevent and combat illegal immigration, to increase the capacity for improved management of immigration and to study the best way of proceeding to the exchange of information on legal migration and labour possibilities, for example, by establishing migration profiles.

The European Neighbourhood Policy establishes the framework to create a system of joint management of borders. The creation of joint Hispanic-Moroccan border patrols is an example, but once again this is a bilateral action. In May of 2006 a project financed jointly by Spain and the European Commission was launched for cooperation between Spain and Mauritania in the patrolling of the Mauritanian coast. This it is the first case of the Commission financing an operation carried out entirely in the territory of a non-member country.

From the perspective of African countries it is hard to accept that in recent months its capitals are appearing among European diplomatic objectives, their main objective being the signing of readmission agreements, which constitutes a very unpopular measure among its citizens.

In the last months, two new impulses have made in this aspects. The Sea Horse Programme, presented in Madrid in March 2006, aims at combating illegal immigration. The

main objective is to strengthen co-operation between the countries of origin, transit and destination of illegal immigrants to more effectively fight human trafficking at the grassroots level. Running from 2006-2008, Sea Horse, which forms part of the European Migratory Routes initiative, is being run jointly by Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Italy, Germany, Portugal, France, and Belgium. In the countries affected by the illegal immigration problem, Sea Horse envisions effective policies to prevent human trafficking, the development of dialogue on migratory questions within the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, and supporting and involving Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal in fighting the problem.

In a context marked by the intensifying humanitarian crises caused by a constantly increasing flux of irregular sub-Saharan immigrants towards Europe, the Rabat Conference, which was held on July 10 and 11, 2006, aimed to urgently address the different aspects and various phases of the migratory process within a spirit of shared responsibility. Following the conclusions of the Informal European Summit in Hampton Court in October 2005 and of the Brussels European Council in December 2005, this meeting sought to promote an innovative partnership which would draw the lines of a future framework of co-operation between Europe and Africa.

With regard to legal immigration, the Commission will study the possibility of establishing with interested neighbouring countries an appropriate scheme for publicising methods of legal migration. This scheme will have as its main objective the collecting of information on employment offers and on available skills in Mediterranean partners in a structured manner. It should also contribute towards keeping partners informed of employment opportunities in Europe and on the steps that should be taken to request employment in the member states of the EU. All of this must respect the principle of community preference, since, obviously, maximum advantage should be taken of labour resources available within the EU.

6) The voice of the UfM: The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures

The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures is a network of civil society organisations dedicated to promoting intercultural dialogue in the Mediterranean region. It was set up in 2005 by the governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed), a political agreement made in 1995 between the European Union and Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Syria and Turkey. The Anna Lindh Foundation facilitates and supports the action of civil society of the Euro-Mediterranean Region in priority fields which affects the capacity for individuals and groups to share values and live together. The Foundation's programme is focused on activities in fields which are essential for human and social dialogue: Education and Youth; Culture and

Arts; Peace and Co-existence; Values, Religion and Spirituality; Cities and Migration; Media. he purpose of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) is to bring people together from across the Mediterranean to improve mutual respect between cultures and to support civil society working for a common future of the Region.

Since its launch in 2005, the ALF has launched and supported action across fields impacting on mutual perceptions among people of different cultures and beliefs, as well as developing a region-wide Network of over 3000 civil society organisations. Through its action and reflection, the ALF aims to contribute to the development of an Intercultural Strategy for the Euro-Mediterranean Region, providing recommendations to decision-makers and institutions and advocating for shared values.

7) ANNEX – Links

a. **Anna Lindh Forum 2010**
   Cities, Migrants and Diversity "*Valuing Diversity, Understanding Migration*"
   Download at http://www.euromedalex.org/forum2010/conclusions

b. **NECE European Conference**
   Cities and Urban Spaces: Chances for Cultural and Citizenship Education
   29 September - 1 October 2010
   Trieste, Italy "Creative" – "Migrant" – "Divided"?
   Visions of Cities and Civic Cultures by Wolfgang Kaschuba
   http://www.bpb.de/files/N1A3L0.pdf

c. **Migrants: actors and vectors of intercultural Dialogue**
   By Betty Okot
   http://www.cfdnetwork.co.uk/sites/cfdnetwork.co.uk/files/Intercultural%20Dialogue%20-%20for%20CoE%20Jan08Doc.pdf

d. **Phil Wood (ed.)** ***Intercultural Cities. Towards a model for intercultural integration. Strasbourg 2009.***